Many of our most important goals require months or even years of effort to achieve, and some never get achieved at all. As social psychologists have lately emphasized, success in pursuing such goals requires the capacity for perseverance, or "grit." Philosophers have had little to say about grit, however, insofar as it differs from more familiar notions of willpower or continence. This leaves us ill-equipped to assess the social and moral implications of promoting grit. We propose that grit has an (...) important epistemic component, in that failures of perseverance are often caused by a significant loss of confidence that one will succeed if one continues to try. Correspondingly, successful exercises of grit often involve a kind of epistemic resilience in the face of failure, injury, rejection, and other setbacks that constitute genuine evidence that success is not forthcoming. Given this, we discuss whether and to what extent displays of grit can be epistemically as well as practically rational. We conclude that they can be (although many are not), and that the rationality of grit will depend partly on features of the context the agent normally finds herself in. In particular, grit-friendly norms of deliberation might be irrational to use in contexts of severe material scarcity or oppression. (shrink)

Suppose some person 'A' sets out to accomplish a difficult, long-term goal such as writing a passable Ph.D. thesis. What should you believe about whether A will succeed? The default answer is that you should believe whatever the total accessible evidence concerning A's abilities, circumstances, capacity for self-discipline, and so forth supports. But could it be that what you should believe depends in part on the relationship you have with A? We argue that it does, in the case where A (...) is yourself. The capacity for "grit" involves a kind of epistemic resilience in the face of evidence suggesting that one might fail, and this makes it rational to respond to the relevant evidence differently when you are the agent in question. We then explore whether similar arguments extend to the case of "believing in" our significant others -- our friends, lovers, family members, colleagues, patients, and students. (shrink)

We sometimes strive to achieve difficult goals when our evidence suggests that success is unlikely – not just because it will require strength of will, but because we are targets of prejudice and discrimination or because success will require unusual ability. Optimism about one’s prospects can be useful for persevering in these cases. That said, excessive optimism can be dangerous; when our evidence is unfavourable, we should be at most agnostic about whether we will succeed. This paper explores the nature (...) and rational significance of agnostic practical commitments. Most importantly, the rationality of striving against the odds can depend on investing in a plan for failure: a plan B. I aim to make headway on an account of what backup plans are, how they are related to primary plans, and whether the standard norms of plan rationality apply to our agnostic commitments. (shrink)

G.E.M. Anscombe famously claimed that acting intentionally entails knowing "without observation" what one is doing. Among those that have taken her claim seriously, an influential response has been to suppose that in order to explain this fact, we should conclude that intentions are a species of belief. This paper argues that there are good reasons to reject this "cognitivist" view of intention in favor of the view that intentions are distinctively practical attitudes that are not beliefs and do not constitutively (...) involve the belief that one will do what one intends. A theory is then proposed on behalf of Distinctive Practical Attitude views of intention to explain Anscombe's non-observational knowledge phenomenon. It is argued that intentions do not embody non-observational knowledge, but they do provide the evidential basis for it: we know without observation what we are doing by inferring from our intentions. (shrink)

This paper discusses the possibility of autonomy in our epistemic lives, and the importance of the concept of the first person in weathering fluctuations in our epistemic perspective over time.

In her thought-provoking symposium contribution, ‘What Is Impostor Syndrome?’, Katherine Hawley fleshes out our everyday understanding of that concept. This response builds on Hawley’s account to ask the ameliorative question of whether the everyday concept best serves the normative goals of promoting social justice and enhancing well-being. I raise some sceptical worries about the usefulness of the notion, in so far as it is centred on doxastic attitudes that include doubt about one’s own talent or skill. I propose instead that (...) a narrower conception emphasizing the debilitating emotional and behavioural consequences of such beliefs might be preferable, and that the causes of such consequences would be better thought of as unjustified rather than false beliefs about one’s own competence. (shrink)

There is a puzzle about how to understand the conclusion of a successful instance of practical reasoning. Do the considerations adduced in reasoning rationalize the particular doing of an action, as Aristotle is sometimes interpreted as claiming? Or does reasoning conclude in the formation of an attitude – an intention, say – that has an action-type as its content? This paper attempts to clarify what is at stake in that debate and defends the latter view against some of its critics.

How do we know what our intentions are? It is argued that work on self-knowledge has tended to neglect the attitude of intention, and that an epistemological account is needed that is attuned to the specific features of that state. Richard Moran’s Authorship view, on which we can acquire self-knowledge by making up our minds, offers a promising insight for such an account: we do not normally discover what we intend through introspection. However, his formulation of the Authorship view, developed (...) primarily with the attitude of belief in mind, is found wanting when applied to intention. An alternative account is proposed for knowledge of one’s own intentions that gives a central role to the mental act of deciding what to do. It is argued that we can come to know what we intend by making a decision about what to do and self-ascribing the content of that decision as our intended action. (shrink)

What is the role of practical thought in determining the intentional action that is performed? Donald Davidson’s influential answer to this question is that thought plays an efficient-causal role: intentional actions are those events that have the correct causal pedigree in the agent's beliefs and desires. But the Causal Theory of Action has always been plagued with the problem of “deviant causal chains,” in which the right action is caused by the right mental state but in the wrong way. This (...) paper addresses an alternative approach to understanding intentional action inspired by G.E.M. Anscombe, interpreting that view as casting practical thought in the role of formal rather than efficient cause of action and thereby avoiding the problem of deviant (efficient) causal chains. Specifically, on the neo-Anscombean view, it is the agent’s “practical knowledge” – non-observational, non-inferential knowledge of what one is doing – that confers the form of intentional action on an event and is the contribution of thought to determining what is intentionally done. This paper argues that the Anscombean view is subject to its own problematic type of deviance: deviant formal causation. What we know non-observationally about what we are doing often includes more than what we intend to be doing; we also know that we are bringing about the foreseen side effects of acting in the intended way. It is argued that the neo-Anscombean view faces difficulty in excluding the expected side effects from the specification of what is intentionally done, whereas the Causal Theory has no such difficulty. Thus, the discussion amounts to an argument in favor of the Causal Theory of Action. (shrink)

Is there a rational requirement enjoining continence over time in the intentions one has formed, such that anyone going in for a certain form of agency has standing reason to conform to such a requirement? This paper suggests that there is not. I argue that Michael Bratman’s defense of such a requirement succeeds in showing that many agents have a reason favoring default intention continence much of the time, but does not establish that all planning agents have such a reason (...) in every case of intending. I then defend an account on which such a reason is grounded in the need to maintain the capacity to commit oneself to a practical option. But although I think this applies more widely than Bratman’s account, it is also not a reason that any planning agent has in every case. I tentatively conclude that although we have many good reasons to stick with our intentions once we have formed them, it is not required by rationality. (shrink)

In philosophical inquiry into the mind, the metaphor of ‘transparency’ has been attractive to many who are otherwise in deep disagreement. It has thereby come to have a variety of different and mutually incompatible connotations. The mind is said to be transparent to itself, our perceptual experiences are said to be transparent to the world, and our beliefs are said to be transparent to – a great many different things. The first goal of this essay is to sort out the (...) different uses of the notion of transparency in the context of the philosophy of mind. The remainder of the essay will then be devoted to examining so-called Transparency theories of self-knowledge, or how we know our own minds. This type of theory has attracted a great deal of interest in recent years, but its prospects hinge on answers to unresolved questions concerning the epistemological details of the account and the scope of its ambitions. (shrink)

Is there a sense in which we exercise direct volitional control over our beliefs? Most agree that there is not, but discussions tend to focus on control in forming a belief. The focus here is on sustaining a belief over time in the face of ‘epistemic temptation’ to abandon it. It is argued that we do have a capacity for ‘doxastic self-control’ over time that is partly volitional in nature, and that its exercise is rationally permissible.

The attitude of intention is not usually the primary focus in philosophical work on self-knowledge. A recent exception is the so-called “Transparency” theory of self-knowledge, which attempts to explain how we know our own minds by appeal to reflection on non-mental facts. Transparency theories are attractive in light of their relative psychological economy compared to views that must posit a dedicated mechanism of ‘inner sense’. However, it is argued here, focusing on proposals by Richard Moran and Alex Byrne, that the (...) Transparency approach to explaining knowledge of our intentions fails. Considerations of economy therefore recommend an alternative approach: the Rylean Theory Theory. The particular view defended here is that one way of coming to know what we intend is to self-ascribe an intention on the basis of making a conscious decision about what to do. This view requires that there are such things as conscious decisions, and so the existence of conscious decisions is defended against skeptical worries raised by Peter Carruthers. The conclusion is that we know of our intentions by theorizing about ourselves, but that this knowledge can still be first-personally privileged, authoritative, and non-alienated. (shrink)

G.E.M. Anscombe famously remarked that an adequate philosophy of psychology was needed before we could do ethics. Fifty years have passed, and we should now ask what significance our best theories of the psychology of agency have for moral philosophy. My focus is on non-moral conceptions of autonomy and self-governance that emphasize the limits of deliberation -- the way in which one's cares render certain options unthinkable, one's intentions and policies filter out what is inconsistent with them, and one's resolutions (...) function to block further reflection. I argue that we can expect this deliberative "silencing" to lead to moral failures that occur because the morally correct option was filtered out of the agent's deliberation. I think it follows from these conceptions of self-governance that we should be considered culpable for unwitting acts and omissions, even if they express no ill will, moral indifference, or blameworthy evaluative judgments. The question is whether this consequence is acceptable. Either way, the potential tradeoff between self-governance and moral attentiveness is a source of doubt about recent attempts to ground the normativity of rationality in our concern for self-governance. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung:Ausgehend von der philosophischen Grundhaltung Kants, dass jedes System von empiri‐schen Urteilen – jede empirische Theorie – seine epistemologische Grundlage in einem System von synthetischen Sätzen, die hierfür apriorisch akzeptiert werden, hat, wird eine Axiomatisierung der Mechanik bis hin zum Impulsbegriff nach H. Hermes dargestellt. Dieses System von Axiomen veyendet als Grundbegriffe lediglich den der reellen Zahlen, den des Bezugssystem, der den Übergang zum mathematischen Raum ermöglicht, und den der Genidentität, der das stetige Fortschreiten von Materiepunkten beschreibt.Das System von Hermes (...) wird als eine mogliche Métaphysik der Mechanik gesehen; somit wird der Fundamentalismus Kants bezüglich der Einzigkeit eines solchen Systems abgelehnt. (shrink)

First, the paper argues that Tarski's theory of language levels is best understood not only as a method for avoiding semantic paradoxes by rigidly restricting the expressive power of a language, but as a natural expression of an epistemological process of reflection which is more adequately understood as a process and not by its result. Second, it is argued that the apparent philosophical controversy between materialism and idealism dissolves whithin this process of reflection. If one has raised above the lowest (...) level, one always is a materialist as well as an idealist; however, one is so in relation to different levels. (shrink)

It is shown that-at least in contemporary physics-the single measuring results are completely irrelevant w.r.t. testing a metric law. As a consequence, laws are neither gained by induction nor rejected by falsification. Even statistical generalizations of measuring values, when-in the sense of some philosophers-falsifying laws are not always regarded as falsifying instances by physicists.

It is shown that-at least in contemporary physics-the single measuring results are completely irrelevant w.r.t. testing a metric law. As a consequence, laws are neither gained by induction nor rejected by falsification. Even statistical generalizations of measuring values, when-in the sense of some philosophers-falsifying laws are not always regarded as falsifying instances by physicists.

It was 250 years ago that Immanuel Kant’s “Kritik der reinen Vernunft” was published first. Generations of philosophers regarded this work as the ne plus ultra in epistemology or metaphysics of knowledge. Since central parts of his doctrine can, to say the least, be considered to be incompatible with fundamentals in current physical theorizing, many philosophers have continued to explore his ideas. Some of them do so believing that Kant’s convictions have definitely been proved to be true and that therefore (...) physical theories contradicting them are either flatly wrong or at least inadequately formulated; others try to reformulate his ideas in a way appropriate to provide a Letztbegründung for physical theories in general. Still others, and that includes the larger part of all the Kant researchers, are not interested mainly in these questions of truth but in all kinds of philological and historical questions concerning the position of his work in the flow of philosophical thinking. (shrink)

Die Platonische Position des mengentheoretischen Universalismus, nach der das Mengenuniversum sprachunabhängig existiert, durch reine Anschauung erkannt und sprachlich mitteilbar ist, kann aus folgenden Gründen nicht aufrechterhalten werden: Die metalogischen Ergebnisse von Skolem und Löwenheim zeigen, daß die von einem Platonisten verwendete Sprache der engeren Quantorenlogik NichtStandard-Modelle besitzt, so daß er daher insbesondere nicht mitteilen kann, was er mit,Allklasse',,leere Klasse' und,Element' meint, da es nicht intendierte Interpretationen für diese Ausdrücke gibt. Hieraus folgt, daß der Zermelosche Mengentrichter, den der Platonist als durch (...) reine Anschauung zu erkennen vorgibt, auch im Sinne einer von ihm nicht intendierten Sprache der einfachen Typentheorie interpretierbar ist. Des weiteren gibt es weder die absolute Folge der Sprachstufen noch die dabei vorausgesetzten Ontologien. Diese Argumente stärken die Auffassung eines ontologischen Relativismus im Sinne von Gorgias. (shrink)

Die Platonische Position des mengentheoretischen Universalismus, nach der das Mengenuniversum sprachunabhängig existiert, durch reine Anschauung erkannt und sprachlich mitteilbar ist, kann aus folgenden Gründen nicht aufrechterhalten werden: Die metalogischen Ergebnisse von Skolem und Löwenheim zeigen, daß die von einem Platonisten verwendete Sprache der engeren Quantorenlogik NichtStandard-Modelle besitzt, so daß er daher insbesondere nicht mitteilen kann, was er mit,Allklasse',,leere Klasse' und,Element' meint, da es nicht intendierte Interpretationen für diese Ausdrücke gibt. Hieraus folgt, daß der Zermelosche Mengentrichter, den der Platonist als durch (...) reine Anschauung zu erkennen vorgibt, auch im Sinne einer von ihm nicht intendierten Sprache der einfachen Typentheorie interpretierbar ist. Des weiteren gibt es weder die absolute Folge der Sprachstufen noch die dabei vorausgesetzten Ontologien. Diese Argumente stärken die Auffassung eines ontologischen Relativismus im Sinne von Gorgias. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungAusgehend von einer operational vorgehenden Wissenschaftstheorie, die die kantische Ein‐teilung der erfahrungswissenschaftlichen Urteile auf den heutigen Stand dieser philosophischen Disziplin überträgt, wird eine Epistemologie entwickelt, welche sich sowohl an den Ergebnissen der Metalogik und philosophischen Semantik als auch an den empirischen Hypothesen der gegen‐wärtigen Wahrnehmungspsychologie orientiert. In bezug auf den Inhalt des zugrundegelegten Universums der zu interpretierenden Sprache wird hierbei eine Position des Suppositionismus vertreten, welche von einem sprachabhängigen Erkennen der Objekte ausgeht, deren Existenz somit nur vorausgesetzt werden kann. Bezüglich (...) der Form des Universums wird eine extensionali‐stische Haltung eingenommen, und die Frage nach der Rechtfertigung der Voraussetzungen empi‐rischer Erkenntnis wird im Sinne eines Kondilionalismus entschieden, welcher insbesondere ein apriorisches Beweisen dieser Voraussetzungen ablehnt und somit auch epistemologische Umschichtungen beim Wechsel von Erfahrungserkenntnis berücksichtigt. (shrink)

It was shown by Frege that four of the five axioms of Peano can be regarded as analytical truths; and it was shown by Russell that the remaining axiom cannot be regarded as being analytically true or even as being analytically false, that this axiom thus is to be regarded as a synthetic statement. In using the concept of apriority in the sense of Reichenbach, it can be shown that this synthetic axiom is to be regarded as an apriorical truth (...) within the usual background theory of measuring theories, which are used not as generalizations of empirical results but as— not moreover provable— preconditions of receiving measuring results and of ordering these results. Furthermore, the systems of numbers, starting with the natural numbers, are developed in a way such that the pre-rational numbers— but not the rational ones— turn out to be those ones which are used in performing measurements according to such theories, while the pre-real numbers— but not the real ones— then turn out to be those ones which are used in using such measuring theories together with their background theories for purely theoretical reasons. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungOhne Zweifel stehen Sprachen und Konventionen in engen Beziehungen zueinander; grosse Teile der Oberflächenstrukturen unserer natürlichen Sprachen hängen von Konventionen ab, und um aussersprachliches Verhalten durch Konventionen zu regeln, benötigt man eine gemeinsame Sprache. Zu fragen ist dann, ob eine reale oder idealisierte Gemeinschaft von Personen sich eine gemeinsame Sprache durch irgendeine Art von Konvention erstmals schaffen kann, ohne dabei bereits ausdrücklich oder stillschweigend eine gemeinsame Sprache zu benützen, die nicht weniger ausdrücksreich als die zu kreierende ist. Es wird gezeigt, (...) dass dies in unserer faktischen Welt nicht der Fall ist, und diese empirischen Gründe werden durch philosophische Argumente erhärtet, die sich auf Ergebnisse der Metalogik und der Wissenschaftstheorie beziehen, wonach eine Erstschaffung einer gemeinsamen Sprache ohne Voraussetzung einer mindestens genauso aus‐drucksreichen Sprache der Teilnehmer – vom logischen Gesichtspunkt aus gesehen unmöglich ist, d. h. in keiner möglichen Welt vorkommt.SummaryThere can be no doubt that languages and conventions are interrelated one to another; large parts of the surface structure of some given natural language depends on conventions, and some common language is necessary to create conventions with regard to non‐lingual behaviour. Then the question arises, whether or not some real or idealized community may create a common language via some kind of convention without using explicitely or implicitely some common language being at least as rich as the language to be created. It is pointed out that this does not hold in our factual world, and those empirical reasons are supported by philosophical arguments referring to results of metalogic and philosophy of science indicating that radical creation of some common language without using some common language being at least as rich as the other is impossible from a logical point of view, i. e. will never occur in any possible world.RésuméSans aucun doute, langues et conventions sont en relation étroite les unes avec les autres; pour une grande part, les structures superficielles de nos langues naturelles dépendent de conventions et, pour régler par conventions notre comportement non linguistique, il faut un langage commun. On peut ensuite se demander si une communauté réelle ou idéalisée peut se constituer, par quelque genre de convention, un langage commun sans pour cela utiliser, explicitement ou implicitement, un langage commun qui n'est pas moins riche en potentialités expressives que celui qu'il s'agit ?on;établir. On montre que cela ne se produit pas dans un monde factuel, et ces arguments empiriques sont confirmés par des arguments philosophiques se référant à des résultats de la métalogique et de la théorie de la science, selon lesquels la création originelle ?on;une langue commune est, du point de vue logique, impossible sans supposer chez les participants un langage au moins aussi riche. (shrink)